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Introduction
For the past few years workers’ participation in decisions 
associated with the running of factories has become a much 
discussed question in Hungarian industrial relations. Shop- 
floor democracy, however, is much more than a fashionable 
topic for discussion in industry, science or politics. It is a 
real social problem waiting for a solution. Workers’ partici­
pation has emerged as an outcom e of a num ber of recent 
industrial and socio-economic advances which have had a 
major im pact on our working class, and on industrial and 
social processes in our country. This progress has made us 
question many traditional approaches to  the m otivation of 
workers and encouraged us to  look for new solutions.13 One 
of these is the prom otion of the direct participation of 
workers in shopfloor decisions. Although indirect w orkers’ 
participation, e.g. through trade union representatives, is of 
the utm ost im portance in Hungary and well deserves 
attention, it cannot be discussed within the compass of the 
present article, which will be strictly limited to  the question 
of direct participation.
Tiie background to shopfloor democracy in Hungary
The development of workers’ participation is a result of 
changes which have taken place in the characteristics and 
position of the working class over the past few decades. In 
Hungary, the working class has undergone considerable 
change since the 1920s or even the 1950s: the structure of 
industrial jobs has been transform ed, physical working con­
ditions have much improved, the social context of industrial 
work has been reshaped, workers’ education has increased, 
their knowledge has widened and job security and living 
standards have much improved. This transform ation of 
industrial jobs, workshops and workers has happened in 
association with a general development of work organisation 
and technology in industry, being related, for example, to 
the extension of mechanisation, the introduction  of auto­
mation, the use of flow and mass production. At the same 
time similar progress has taken place in sectors outside 
industry; the educational system, health, social security, etc. 
These positive changes have been supported by a consider­
able growth of national income and national product. The 
development of Hungary, its rapid industrialisation and the 
form ation of its present working class have come about as
3 This paper is based on an article ‘W orkers’ direct participation in 
decisions in Hungarian factories’, originally published in International 
Labour R eview , vol. 116, no. 1, Ju ly -A ugust 1977 and is reproduced 
by permission o f the ILO.
t> These changes, which will be summed up briefly in the following 
pages, have taken similar courses in most industrial countries and 
have contributed to  the development o f workers’ direct participation.
a result o f political initiatives and the movement towards 
workers’ participation is closely related to  these political 
processes. In this respect a key factor has been the estab­
lishment o f the rule o f the working class and its party and 
of socialist ownership of the means of production.
Industrial and socio-economic progress have cast doubts on 
many traditional ideas of motivation and management. 
Educated and socially active workers, with secure jobs and 
steadily improving living standards, become more and more 
interested in the content of their work, and in the wider 
social context of their production activities. Unpleasant 
(boring, physically hard, dirty) jobs, bad working condi­
tions, uncongenial supervisors and work-mates have less 
and less attraction for workers, even if accompanied by 
high wages — although the latter are still of primary im por­
tance to  the majority. Among working people there is a 
need for shopfloor democracy, for having a say in things, 
and such workers are increasingly capable of making a 
valuable contribution to  decisions that touch them directly. 
Also the present five-year plan in Hungary is impeded by 
a labour shortage and it is hoped that worker participation 
can increase efficiency and assist economic problems. It is 
therefore easy to  understand why many companies - as the 
cases discussed in this paper will show — are interested in its 
development. But there is more to  it than that. The decisive 
push towards workers’ participation has come from the 
party. The party believes that factory democracy is not 
primarily a remedy for problems of efficiency (poor perfor­
mances, loose discipline, etc.); it is a tool by which to 
strengthen the co-operation of people, to  forge a unity of 
action within the factory and in society as a whole. Shop­
floor democracy cannot therefore be considered solely as a 
means to  prom ote certain economic or social aims: it is an 
integral part o f Hungarian social and political democracy 
and of socialist industrial and social relations.0
W orkers’ participation and industrial democracy today are 
still far from satisfactory in Hungary? A factor in this state
c The need to develop shopfloor democracy has been specified in 
several documents o f the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party. The 
decisions o f the Eleventh (and most recent at the time o f writing) 
Congress were as follows: ‘Office and shopfloor democracy is an 
integral part o f  socialist democracy: it provides the opportunity for 
actual participation in the management o f factories, in running local 
and public affairs, and in decisions related to them. It helps to 
develop the creative character o f work, it is an im portant tool in the 
form ation of socialist relations between managers and their subor­
dinates, it increases the employees’ sense o f responsibility and 
activity.’ [1]
d T h e  functioning o f shopfloor democracy does not meet the 
desired requirements, thus it has to  be developed both in its con­
tents and m ethods.’ [2]
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of affairs is the insufficiency of our scientific knowledge 
about how to achieve it. It must be stressed that the inter­
pretation of participation given in this paper comes mostly 
from the authors’ own theoretical and empirical research as, 
at present, there is no generally accepted concept of shop- 
floor democracy in the Hungarian social sciences. But des­
pite this theoretical uncertainty there cannot be much 
doubt about the essence of the concept. If participation is 
considered to  be a too l for strengthening co-operation, for 
forging a unity of action and objectives in factories and in 
the society — and it is interpreted in this way in the P arty’s 
policy - then its primary function is to  mediate between 
the differing, and often conflicting, needs and interests of 
workers and other social groups, including managers. This 
mediation has the objective of achieving a fit between 
ambitions and opportunities. The aim of such participation 
is the establishment of the kind of industrial and social 
relations which will encourage the development of co­
operation among people under changing social and economic 
conditions? (This concept o f participation does not contra­
dict the notion tha t shopfloor dem ocracy also satisfies 
certain employee needs.)
The scope o f workers’ participation in decision-making
One of the most crucial practical problems we face in devel­
oping shopfloor democracy is: for what kinds of decisions 
can it be utilised? In what areas can workers best make 
their influence felt? If the primary function of participation 
is to  mediate different interests, then this would suggest 
that the focus should be on those decisions in which workers 
have a direct interest, which are close to  their day-to-day 
activities, and which they can readily understand. Informal
worker participation in such decisions had existed long 
before the political programme for developing formal shop­
floor dem ocracy was declared! Data on this topic have 
been collected by the authors of the present paper in the 
Hungarian Railway Carriage and Machine Works and in 
some other organisations since 1968.
In 1974 we investigated how workers perceived the oppor­
tunities for direct or indirect participation in different 
kinds of decisions in three plants of Hungarian Railway 
Carriage and Machine Works, and the results are presented 
in Table 1 below.
As the data show, workers perceived opportunities for 
participation in
(a) workshop or plant level decisions which
(b) directly related to  their jobs within the workshop and 
the plant and
(c) the formalisation of which made their involvement 
possible.
These were decisions on work organisation, working condi­
tions, wages, etc. Less opportunity  was perceived and con­
siderable ignorance shown with regard to  higher level 
(com pany) decisions, for example, about production, per­
sonnel planning, the introduction  of new technology, etc. 
and decisions normally taken by com pany management, 
such as hiring workers.
In the Hungarian Railway Carriage and Machine Works we 
also had the opportunity  of observing an experiment in 
which, in 1968—69, the com pany allowed workgroups and 
their leaders (the foreman, the section leader and the shop 
steward) to  decide about the division of wages among group
Table 1
W orkers’ perceptions of scope for direct or indirect participation in decision-making







Work organisation and working conditions 72 24 4
Selection of workers for training courses 64 28 8
Allocation of overtime work 61 36 3
Determ ination of bonuses and other incentives 57 40 3
Workers’ job classification and pay scale 49 48 3
Prom otion of workers 48 45 7
Determ ination of basis and m ethods of wage paym ent 46 52 2
Lay-off and discharge of workers 45 45 10
Disciplinary measures 44 48 8
Transfer to  o ther work places 42 51 7
Development of production plan 30 59 11
Introduction  of new machinery and equipm ent 
Personnel planning (planning of future work force
24 65 11
requirements) 13 76 11
Hiring of workers 11 82 7
Cut-back of production and closing down of plant 6 53 41
Note:
The data presented above come from  L. Hethy and Cs. Mako, A z automatizacio es a m unkastudat (Autom ation and 
what the workers th ink about it), Research Institute for Sociology and Scientific Research Institute for Labour Safety, 
Budapest, 1975, pp. 96—7. Our investigations in the steel industry and in hospitals (directed by T. Tahin) produced 
similar results. See T. Tahin and Cs. Mako, ‘Intensive patient care, as nurses view i t ’, paper presented at the International 
Conference on Medical Sociology, Paris, 6 9 July 1976.
e The Tenth Congress o f  the HSWP stated that differences and 
conflicts o f interest may exist in a socialist society and it underlined 
the necessity o f  mediating these conflicts and ensuring that the 
common social interests prevailed. [3]
f As essential social processes in organisations far exceed the limits 
o f formalisation and legalisation and tne m ediation of interests is one 
o f these basic processes, informal participation probably goes back 
to the appearance of the first industrial organisations.
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members. [4] This pioneer experim ent in workers’ direct 
participation was introduced in areas where new technology 
required collective and constantly changing efforts from 
employees. It helped to  break down the rigid formal wage 
structure, contributed to  the settlem ent of intra-group wage 
distribution conflicts and ensured better co-operation 
within the work groups. This experim ent provided the basis 
for a practice which still continues and also suggested an 
im portant area for worker participation in decisions. Here 
was a workshop level decision which directly affected the 
workers and which they could readily understand.
From the point of view of the workers these kinds of deci­
sions seem suitable for setting up participation programmes 
which are directly related to  their own workshop interests 
-  the organisation of their jobs, their wages, working condi­
tions, etc. - the implications o f which they can most 
readily grasp, given their level of com petence, inform ation 
and education. In Hungary, research and everyday experi­
ence show that workers’ needs and m otivation are still 
primarily related to  material benefits and so decisions con­
cerning wages must have an im portant part to  play in any 
participation programme. We also believe tha t lower level 
(workshop, plant) and short range (operational) decisions 
come closer to and more directly concern the workers’ 
interests than higher level (com pany) and long range 
(strategic) decisions. In addition the form er type of deci­
sion can be m onitored and controlled by the workers as 
problems emerge from the everyday activities o f the w ork­
shop -  while the la tter tend to  reach beyond their level of 
inform ation, com petence, education and control. As the 
structure of w orkers’ needs changes and the improvement 
o f living standards results in a fuller satisfaction of basic 
needs, while at the same tim e the w orkers’ knowledge and 
com petence increases, they can extend their influence into 
higher decision areas.
In deciding what m atters are suitable for participation the 
view of managers must also be taken in to  account; and as 
shopfloor dem ocracy is primarily politically initiated, a 
positive attitude on the part of management cannot be 
taken for granted. To many managers (those of the com­
panies discussed in the present paper are exceptions here) 
participation seems to  be an additional burden or even an 
innovation tha t undermines discipline and reduces efficiency. 
It is certainly true that discussing m atters with workers 
requires preparation and time. Managers have to  explain 
and defend their standpoint and they can become the 
recipients o f justified or unjustified criticism. These un­
pleasant concom itants o f industrial dem ocracy — which are 
present in any other negotiating process can never be 
eliminated, but can be counterbalanced by the benefits of 
participation. Apart from the long term  effects, o f better 
co-operation and more efficiency, it can have other advan­
tages for managers. They can share their work load, delegate 
some of their responsibilities and anticipate and avoid con­
flicts by discussing problems with their subordinates. The 
advantages and disadvantages for managers should be taken 
into account when selecting the type of decision for partic­
ipation. A benefit of the experim ent carried out in the 
Hungarian Railway Carriage and Machine Works was that 
it not only met the expectations by workers, but also eased 
the burdens of managers. The work groups took over the 
difficult task of evaluating the perform ance of their own 
members, together with all the tensions and conflicts 
involved in doing this. The result was tha t both  workers — 
who got a say in a m atter crucial to  them  — and managers 
were happy about participation.
In selecting decisions for participation we have to  consider 
a further question: at what phase in the decision-making
process do we require participation by workers? Decision­
making consists of several phases, including an identifica­
tion  of the problem , its analysis, formulating alternative 
strategies for its solution, choosing the alternative that 
seems to  be the best, putting the decision into practice, etc. 
In theory , workers could take part in the whole of this 
process or in one or more of its phases. However, partial or 
full participation requires very different conditions and 
has very different consequences for workers, managers 
and the whole organisation. Today, in Hungary, workers’ 
direct participation — except for a few types of decisions, 
for example intra-group decisions about the division of 
wages is generally restricted to  one or a few phases of the 
process, while other phases are reserved for indirect partici­
pation and for managerial action. A progressive approach 
to  participation in decision-making involves the possibility 
o f w orkers’ eventual direct participation in m atters that 
seem, at present, to  be rem ote from their everyday interests 
and beyond their horizon, e.g. com pany level strategic 
decisions. It should be noted here that workers are likely to 
express their opinion on m atters on the fringe of their 
interest and knowledge only if their participation is already 
guaranteed in decisions close to  their interests and within 
their im m ediate perspective.
It must be recognised, however, that there is a limit now, 
and in the future, to  direct participation by workers. It 
would be irresponsible and a contradiction of the basic 
realities o f industrial organisation to  push for workers’ 
direct participation in all m atters related to  the functioning 
of industry. It is the logic o f technology, organisation and 
efficient production tha t sets the barrier. But, when direct 
participation is not possible, indirect participation can fill 
the gap. Workers’ control is then realised through worker 
representatives and through Party and trade union organisa­
tions. In Hungary the Party and trade union play an im por­
tan t role in bo th  direct and indirect forms of participation.
Workers’ readiness and ability to participate
In the present era o f socialist development, participation is 
often looked upon as a gift that can be offered by the firm, 
the government, or the Party to  the working class. This 
approach involves the tacit assumption that workers are 
ready, willing and able to  take part in the decision-making 
process and are anxious to  seize the opportunity  offered to 
them. Our research in the Hungarian Railway Carriage and 
Machine Works has proved that the majority of workers are 
indeed ready to  express an opinion in decisions directly 
related to  their interests, though they are happy to  leave 
m atters rem ote from these interests exclusively in the hands 
of management. [5] But this theoretical readiness to  partic­
ipate is far from being unconditional and workers’ real 
involvement in decisions requires the existence of a number 
o f preconditions. Workers themselves do not and cannot 
look upon opportunities for participation in running their 
factory as a gift. Their attitudes are exemplified by a case 
study carried ou t, by A. Simonyi, in 1976, at the Budapest 
Chemical Works. [6]
Budapest Chemical Works took an initiative in 1976 to 
involve 5 0 -6 0  per cent o f  its workers in decisions on wages. 
It was suggested tha t in workshops where the technology 
was appropriate, work groups o f five to  tw enty people 
should decide by secret ballot on how the increases were to 
be distributed and on the majority o f bonuses. Under the 
new system the supervisors (forem en and senior foremen) 
would have the task o f evaluating the work of each worker, 
in the presence of the entire work group, and of making 
proposals for personal wage increases and bonuses. The
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distribution of wages and bonuses was a m atter on which 
group members had very definite ideas. This management 
initiative was rejected by the workers’ representatives (i.e. 
by the conferences o f section leaders and shop stewards). 
They postponed the in troduction of the new procedures 
and decided to  keep to  the previous system, which gave 
much less opportunity  for direct participation by workers 
and reserved the right of decision mostly to  supervisors and 
shop stewards, except for one or two occasional decisions 
on bonuses of m inor importance.
This reaction at the Budapest Chemical Works, which seems 
to  be the opposite o f the attitudes expressed at the 
Hungarian Railway Carriage and Machine Works, can be 
explained by the influence of several factors. These include 
the resistance of foremen, shop stewards and section leaders 
to  giving up some of their rights (that is how the top m an­
agement interpreted it), but also a lack of readiness and 
willingness on the part of workers to  have a direct say in 
this m atter. Participation has its advantages and disadvan­
tages for managers, but how do its costs and benefits look 
to  the workers?
Workers’ interests and needs are more or less efficiently met 
in most factories through the channels for indirect partici­
pation, that is through the activities of the local trade union, 
party organisation and youth  organisation. (In our research 
in the Hungarian Railway Carriage and Machine Works in 
1974 we found that 46.6 per cent o f the workers were fully, 
34.6 per cent mostly and 12.9 per cent more or less satis­
fied with the activities of the party. The equivalent percent­
ages for the trade union were 20.3 per cent, 34.9 per cent 
33.1 per cent). [7] Because of the shortage of workers in 
the labour market, management also endeavours to  satisfy 
their expectations. Thus direct participation in decisions is 
im portant mostly in those areas where workers’ interests 
and needs are not properly catered for. The num ber of such 
cases varies from factory to  factory and time to  tim e, and is 
related to  the efficiency of indirect participation. In the 
Budapest Chemical Works bo th  the party  and trade union 
seemed to  function satisfactorily.
Participation in decisions, as we see it, requires a mental 
effort similar to  taking decisions, even if the am ount of 
effort required is less. This being so, the presence of workers 
in the forums of shopfloor dem ocracy and their involve­
m ent in the decision-making process require tim e and work. 
Through participation in decisions workers get (and should 
get) a share not only of the managers’ rights, but also of 
their tasks and responsibilities. While this work is routine 
for supervisors and managers, for workers it is, at present, a 
new and rather hazardous activity. The worker, because he 
has no previous experience of expressing his opinion in 
public, risks appearing ridiculous, o r even risks provoking 
social conflicts that may be harm ful to  him and to  his 
workgroup.
Stating one’s views in public on any m atter relating to  the 
workshop or the factory always implies making intentional 
or unintentional judgem ent of o thers’ work. This can lead 
to  confrontations with o ther people and most workers do 
not consider it permissible to  criticise supervisors and 
managers openly, especially those at the top of the firm. [8 J 
Workers’ indifference to  an increase in participation in the 
Budapest Chemical Works can mostly be attributed to  their 
reluctance to  undertake additional work and to  generate 
possible conflict.
Readiness and willingness to  participate is also influenced 
by the ability to  play a meaningful part in decisions. In
order for workers to  become active partners of management 
in decision-making they must have an ability to  control 
their own affairs, and to  carry out the analytical work 
associated with taking decisions. For example, the collec­
tion, analysis and in terpretation  of inform ation, the prepar­
ation and presentation of a case, etc., all require a certain 
level o f general knowledge, the existence or lack of which is 
mostly determ ined by the w orkers’ general level of educa­
tion  and culture. Workers should have at least some of the 
knowledge and qualifications which supervisors and mana­
gers need to  acquire and retain their jobs. Of course, limited 
knowledge and education do not make participation in 
decisions impossible, for involvement in certain phases of 
the decision process requires little knowledge, but they do 
set a barrier to  participation. For example, uneducated and 
ill-informed workers can be asked their opinion on how 
wages should be divided, but their actual participation in 
wage decisions requires a good knowledge of the wage sys­
tem , the requirem ents of various jobs, the level of perfor­
mance of o ther workers, the pattern of work organisation, 
the technological process, etc.
Participation in the running of the workshop or the factory 
is largely a group activity. So neither the readiness nor the 
ability o f workers to  take part in decisions can be investi­
gated and considered exclusively at the level of the indiv­
idual. The cohesiveness of a workgroup can reflect the sum 
o f the abilities o f individuals belonging to  it and can reduce 
the individual risks involved in participation. While investi­
gating social conflicts associated with performances and 
wages in 1968—69 in the Hungarian Railway Carriage and 
Machine Works, we found tightly knit work groups which 
were perfectly capable of grasping the whole managerial 
decision-making process, and even of working out a strategy 
and set of tactics to  influence this process in a way which 
suited their interests. They also accepted the shopfloor and 
factory level confrontations which their activities caused. [9 ] 
It was probably the cohesiveness o f these work groups, 
among other factors, tha t contributed to  the success of the 
com pany’s experiment in participation in 1968—69. In the 
development o f industrial democracy, work groups (among 
them  what in Hungary are called ‘socialist brigades’) are 
destined to  play a key role.
In summ ary, readiness and ability to  participate seem to  be 
an attribu te o f individuals and groups, but one tha t is greatly 
influenced by the surrounding environm ent of the workshop, 
factory and society. Changes in this environment may 
increase or decrease readiness and ability to  participate. The 
process of participation is closely connected with the 
progress o f socio-economic development and of social 
relations within the workshop, the factory and industry.
Organisational requirem ents
Workers’ participation in workshop and factory level 
decision-making is a social and organisational process. It 
cannot be realised unless suitable conditions are first estab­
lished. [ 10] Realisation of this fact has strongly influenced 
the development programmes for shopfloor democracy in 
Hungary. One of the first steps was the form ation of the 
necessary forum s and institutions for direct participation 
by workers (production and brigade conferences, etc.) 
Since then these institutions have come in for a great deal 
of criticism because many of them have taken on merely 
the outward forms of shopfloor dem ocracy, while lacking 
its spirit — real participation by workers in running their 
workshop and factory. [11]
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One im portant conclusion to  be drawn from these discus­
sions is that forums, although necessary for participation, 
are not enough. A series of co-ordinated and complex 
changes needs to  be made in the whole structure and func­
tioning of the organisation and in the practice and thinking 
o f management in such a way tha t they support the prog­
ramme of participation. Failing this the forums and com­
mittees will be an em pty formality.
Difficulties in the work o f participation bodies emerge 
mostly if their functioning is not supported by com plem en­
tary organisational changes and if they are misused. For 
example, a common problem is that workshop and factory 
production conferences, which are held quarterly, discuss 
m atters in which the m ajority of the participants are not 
interested, while at the same time they ignore questions of 
vital im portance to  many people. Also, they are often 
hurriedly organised between two shifts under pressure of 
time while the large num ber of people present discourages 
people from speaking. Widespread experim ents have taken 
place to  find ways for improving the forums of shopfloor 
democracy, and all of them  support the view that the 
present institutional framework is broadly satisfactory, but 
that it has to  be used in such a way tha t participation is 
really achieved.9 There have also been experim ents directed 
at prom oting workers’ participation in decision-making 
through com plex, co-ordinated changes in the functioning 
and structure of an industrial organisation and in the 
attitudes and practice of its management. Such pioneer 
experiments were started at Taurus Rubber Works in the 
second half o f the 1960s. [12]
A favourable precondition for the Taurus experim ent was 
the fact that the com pany had a very decentralised decision­
making system, and top management delegated many im por­
tan t decisions to  the local plants. To create an institutional 
framework for participation, the com pany organised a core 
group of workers, which in 1973 represented almost 60 
per cent o f the labour force. It consisted of people who 
were highly qualified, had a good knowledge of their work­
shop and plant, had achieved good perform ances in produc­
tion, had been loyal to  the com pany and showed readiness 
to  participate in running its affairs. To get into the core 
group, workers had to  pass a kind of entry exam. Although 
there was no seniority requirem ent, the indirect effect o f 
other requirem ents influenced the com position of the 
group, with the result that mostly people of long service 
belonged to  it. Members of the core group regularly 
received inform ation about the affairs o f the com pany 
through various channels: supervisors and managers within 
the plant supplied them  with verbal inform ation, the com ­
pany’s newspaper set up a column dealing with problems of 
interest to  them , the managing director prepared a quarterly 
report on the state of the com pany for them , etc. Major 
decisions were regularly discussed at workshop and factory 
conferences and an annual conference was also held at the 
company level. Taurus Works took an interest in the m oti­
vation of its employees too  and members of the core group 
received higher cash incentives than other workers. Their 
share in com pany profits was double and these could 
am ount to  15 per cent o f their anijual income. It should also 
be noted that this participation programme was not a sub­
stitu te for, but com plem ented the work of the nationally 
instituted forums of factory democracy.
9 Both our party documents and those of the National Council o f 
Trade Unions voice the opinion that the introduction o f  new forums 
o f democracy is not desirable in our factories. As a result o f  a recent 
experiment (organised by the Ministry o f Labour and the National 
Council o f  Trade Unions at fifty companies) the channels o f  indirect 
participation have been developed instead, by the strengthening of 
the rights o f shop stewards.
Although the experim ent of the Taurus Rubber Works had 
some shortcomings, it proved that the development of 
workshop democracy cannot, in the long term , be prom ­
oted by isolated modifications of the organisational struc­
ture; it needs a set o f co-ordinated and complex changes. 
These will include the setting up participation bodies, the 
selection of decisions suitable for participation, a decen­
tralised decision-making system, training programme for 
workers to  develop their knowledge about their work envir­
onm ent, the establishment of channels o f inform ation and 
financial incentives that increase the workers’ willingness 
and ability to  participate. With such an approach it is clear 
that the widening of participation must be based on a de­
manding and continuing process of learning in which both 
workers’ behaviour, a ttitudes and thinking and managers’ 
approach, practice and m ethods are subjected to  consider­
able change.
The developm ent of workers’ direct participation in deci­
sions appears to  be partly a process of organisational change 
and partly one of learning. In Hungary both are supported 
by the existing practice of indirect participation. The dem o­
cratic manner in which the Party, trade unions and youth 
organisations function makes it possible and necessary for 
large num bers o f workers, supervisors and managers to 
discuss day-to-day operating decisions, to  reconcile different 
interests and needs with the opportunities offered by the 
firm and by society. In these organisations people become 
experienced in running their own affairs and become know­
ledgeable enough to  move on to  direct participation. The 
special structure of socialist industrial enterprises which 
involves the presence and co-operation of at least three 
organisations of major im portance: management, Party and 
trade union, offers favourable opportunities for indirect 
participation by workers. The Party and the trade union 
have a considerable control o f affairs at each decision level 
in the firm. Also many workers play an active role in both 
Party and trade union activities.11 This structure has great 
advantages but it can have some disadvantages. This is why 
direct participation by workers can, and should, serve as a 
useful and necessary agent for controlling indirect or 
representative participation)
Research on participation in Hungary
Since the development of workers’ participation was adop­
ted as a social objective in Hungary, research in the social 
sciences has commenced and produced the first results on 
participation. Given the present stage of scientific know­
ledge, however, social science research has inevitably given 
insufficient results, somewhat contradictory and frequently 
burdened by antiquated political and ideological ideas. This 
situation is a consequence o f the belated rebirth of sociology 
in the 1960s, which has meant that there have been few 
concrete investigations on im portant social issues in industry 
in Hungary. Gaps in sociological data and theory (e.g. organ­
isational, m otivational and decision-making theory) caused 
problems of interpretation even though there was consider­
able sociological knowledge about participation and democ­
racy.
As shopfloor dem ocracy is a process closely related to  the 
overall progress o f society and the economy, its analysis 
from an approach of general social theory seems to  be justi-
h In the companies we investigated between 6 and 10 per cent o f  
workers belong to  the Party, bu t in other enterprises this proportion 
can be as high as 25 per cent. The proportion o f trade union mem­
bers in most places exceeds 90 per cent.
i This necessity was dem onstrated, among other things by the high 
labour turnover in our industry in the years after 1968. [13]
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fied and necessary. Workers’ participation in decisions has 
been analysed within the framework o f the general social 
theory of Marxism. Factory democracy has been discussed 
firstly, in term s of its relationship to  the institutional 
framework of the socialist society, [14] secondly, in terms 
of its relationship to  the nature of ownership under social­
ism [15] and, thirdly, its relationship to  the harm onisation 
of divergent interests under socialism. [16] This type of 
analysis, derived from general social theory, is of essential 
im portance for understanding the theoretical basis of both 
political action and practical social science research.
Empirical research, in the social sciences, although sporadic 
and uneven, has produced results which can be of use to  
both industry and society. [17] Most investigations have 
focused on the functioning of the institutions of shopfloor 
democracy and have analysed the attitudes of workers to  
these. Surveys based on more objective sources of inform a­
tion have been rare and few attem pt to  draw theoretical 
conclusions. This hinders the development of a sociological 
theory of participation and also hinders the progress of 
empirical research itself. Investigations are frequently 
restricted to the collection of empirical data, and this 
inhibits the researchers’ ability to  build valid theory. Even 
if — as in the present paper — researchers nevertheless 
attem pt to  reach some general conclusions, they necessarily 
contain a considerable am ount o f conjecture.
Conclusions
Widespread social, political and ideological illusions and 
misconceptions about participation in Hungary mostly have 
their roots in the inadequacy of its theoretical in terpret­
ation by social scientists. The basic idea behind workers’ 
participation is often forgotten; either the burden and 
effort it inevitably involves are over-emphasised and it is 
considered as a handicap to  industrial productivity and 
progress or, in contrast, its advantages are unduly stressed 
and it becomes a source of anxiety that industrial efficiency 
and discipline might undermine the dem ocratic nature of 
socialist industrial relations. In our view, workers’ participa­
tion, if interpreted as a means o f mediating between differ­
ent interests within an industrial organisation, tends to  
prom ote rather than hinder co-operation and unity  of 
action in the workshop and factory. It then becomes a 
major contributor to  organisational and industrial efficiency.
Much discussion is needed on how workers’ participation 
will develop in the future. The problem is often form u­
lated (influenced by the normative approach of adminis­
trative sciences) in term s of adm inistrative measures neces­
sary to  develop the formal organisational framework of 
dem ocracy; for example, the establishm ent o f formally 
regulated rights, responsibilities and relations among people 
in workshops and factories. A lthough the im portance of 
these administrative aspects cannot be denied, it is clear 
that more than this is required. Shopfloor democracy can 
not be viewed as a narrow administrative question; it must 
be seen as a wide organisational, social and political issue. 
Its development will make specific demands on individuals 
and groups, and on organisations including firm, trade 
union and Party organisations and on the whole of 
society. Today, in Hungary, our responsibility is to  provide 
the necessary conditions for its success through influencing 
the attitudes of people and the structure and functioning of 
organisations. The establishment o f these conditions is assis­
ted to  a great extent by the existence of socialist social 
relations in our society (the means of production are owned 
by the State and political power is in the hands of the
working class and its Party), but it is not brought about 
autom atically by these. The development o f shopfloor, 
factory and socialist democracy needs systematic and pur­
poseful efforts both  now and in the future, as it was stated 
by the Eleventh Congress o f the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers Party.
The exchange o f ideas between social scientists on this 
topic of general social interest can also contribute to  the 
progress o f shopfloor and factory democracy.
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